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Notes
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
General Signal Corp.: Commercial Free
Speech and the Fair Use Doctrine of
Copyright
INTRODUCTION

A grant of copyright in a creative work secures for its author a
limited monopoly over the use of that work.' Unauthorized copying of a work generally constitutes infringement.2 Not all copying
of an author's work, however, is deemed an infringement.' The
statutorily defined defense of fair use permits copying for purposes
such as criticism, news reporting, scholarship, and research.4
It has traditionally been held that the use of another's work for
commercial purposes is presumptively unfair.' In fact, the Copy1. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). This section sets out the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner, which include the right to reproduce copies of the work, the right
to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending,
and in certain cases the right to perform the work publicly or display the work publicly.
Congress enacted the copyright statute pursuant to U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which
grants Congress the power to "promot(e) the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."
2. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982) states that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or who imports
copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer
of the copyright."
3. The Copyright Act lists several limitations on the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner, including fair use, reproduction by libraries, exemption performances and displays, secondary transmissions, and ephemeral recordings. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112 (1982).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (stating that commercial purposes do
not promote the advancement of arts or sciences); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174-76 (S.D. Cal. 1955), ajfd, Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd without an opinion by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958) (emphasizing the commercial nature of an infringing parody of the motion picture
"Gaslight"); Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (holding that the commercial nature of defendant's
copying foreclosed him from copyright protection). The presumption was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774
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right Act states that in determining whether a given use is fair,
consideration should be given to whether the use is for nonprofit
educational purposes rather than for commercial purposes.6 Only
recently has the strict commercial standard been relaxed so that
commercial uses of a copyright owner's work are no longer 'per se'
unfair.7
This trend toward considering certain commercial uses as fair
has paralleled the emergence of the commercial free speech doctrine.8 The first amendment's protection of free speech, like the
fair use defense's protection of copying, has traditionally been extended only to noncommercial settings.9 The Supreme Court has
(1984), in which the Court stated that, "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively . . . unfair .... ." Id. at 793.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) requires consideration of "the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes." It is implied by this factor that nonprofit educational uses do not injure the
copyright owner's market while commercial users will impair the author's market and are
therefore unfair. Under certain circumstances, however, educational uses can also be
intended primarily for commercial gain at the expense of the copyright owner. See, e.g.,
MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914), in which an outline of a college text,
though educational in nature, appropriated so much of the text that the students did not
need to buy the text. This commercial injury dictated a finding of copyright infringement. Id. at 867-68.
7. In Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1980), the court stated that the commercial nature of the use "is certainly not
decisive" on the issue of fair use. Id. at 1175. Similarly, the court in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321 (2d Cir. 1983), stated
that "the fact that profit was involved is, without more, legally irrelevant.
Id. at
332. The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 states:
This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit
limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present law, the commercial and non-profit character of
an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5679.
8. See generally Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw.
U.L. REV. 372 (1979); Jackson and Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Note, First Amendment Protection
for Commercial Speech: An Optical Illusion?, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 799 (1979); Note, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Free Speech and the Value of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
9. For example, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment imposes no restrictions on government in regard to regulating purely commercial speech in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Moreover, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), the Supreme Court held that helpwanted ads were not protectible because they did not express an opinion, but merely
offered possible employment. Id. at 385. Speech which did "no more than propose a
commercial transaction" was held to be unprotected. Id. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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recently recognized, however, that commercial forms of speech,
such as advertising, may serve not only to advance the financial
goals of the speaker, but also to educate the consuming public.' 0
Thus, commercial speech has been accorded first amendment
protection. I
The recent decision in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
General Signal Corp.,2 was the first to combine the doctrines of
fair use and commercial free speech. Consumers Union involved
the Regina Vacuum Company's use of favorable copyrighted language from a Consumer Reports article in its advertising.' 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that Regina's advertising served the important educational function of informing the
public of Consumer Reports' findings. '4 Thus, the defense of commercial free speech dictated that this use be declared fair.
The Consumers Union decision could have the effect of offering a
full-scale grant to freely infringe copyright.1 5 Since the fair use
10. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court held that a consumer's interest in commercial information "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate." Id. at 763. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
11. 425 U.S. at 770. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (which extended first amendment protection to an advertisement for legal abortions, despite its
commercial nature).
12. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc denied, 730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 100 (1984). Although Consumers Union is the first case to combine the defenses of commercial free speech and fair use, it is not the first case to consider
the impact of commercial free speech on copyright law. The district court in Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978)
afl'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), upheld a commercial free speech
defense to copyright infringement involving a comparative advertisement. The court denied that by allowing a first amendment defense, it had stifled the creativity which the
Copyright Act seeks to promote. Id. at 884. Rather, the court argued that creation of
new products would be stimulated due to the availability of comparative advertising. Id.
See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
13. 724 F.2d at 1047 n.2. The magazine found the Regina Power Team to be "far
ahead of the pack in cleaning ability," and that it "did the job with the least effort." Id.
14. Id. at 1049 (citing Virginia Board, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)). The court held that
"Regina's ads include[d] the conveyance to consumers of useful information which is
protected by the First Amendment." Id. By allowing Regina to copy Consumer Reports' language, the public was better educated by being exposed to the useful information a second time.
15. See Consumers Union of U.S. v. General Signal Corp., 730 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir.
1984) (Oakes, J., dissenting), denying reh'g en banc to 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 100 (1984). As the dissenting opinion to the court's denial of a petition
for rehearing en banc stated, "the use of 'commercial free speech' to justify a fair use
defense to copyright infringement stands either the copyright law or the First Amendment on its head." Id. at 50. One commentator has also noted that "if the First Amendment justifies some limited use of the scalpel [against copyright], it does not legitimize
wholesale amputation in vital copyright areas. This may be looming on the horizon
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defense is already regularly allowed for noncommercial uses, the
further extension of the defense to commercial uses, under Consumers Union's commercial free speech justification, could serve to
6
render virtually any infringement a fair use.'
This Note will review the history of the defenses of fair use and
commercial free speech and discuss the tension presently existing
between the Copyright Act and the first amendment. A discussion
of the Consumers Union opinion will follow. The Note will then
analyze the Second Circuit's combination of the defenses of commercial free speech and fair use to a copyright infringement cause
of action. It will conclude with a discussion of the potential harm
that the Consumers Union opinion could have on the future of
copyright protection.
BACKGROUND

History of Fair Use
Copyright protection in an author's work lasts for a period equal
to the life of the author plus fifty years.' 7 This grant of monopoly
to authors is intended to encourage creativity by insuring that the
author and his heirs will enjoy the benefits of his creation.18 The
author's monopoly, however, is not unlimited.' 9
The fair use defense is a judicially created defense to copyright
under the combined banners of the First Amendment and fair use." 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[D] (1983).
16. See infra notes 188, 189 and accompanying text.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
18. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), in which the Supreme Court
stated that the monopoly is based on "the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors .... ." The Court has similarly held that "[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is,
by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good." Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). See generally N. BOORSTYN,
Copyright Law § 1:2 (1981); R. BOWKER, Copyright. Its History and Its Law 1-7 (1912);
M. NICHOLSON, A Manual of Copyright Practice 3-8 (1956).
19. See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), in which it was
held that "courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally
subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater
public interest in the development of art, science and industry." Id. at 544. The problem
of unlimited monopoly was recognized in Sony in Justice Blackmun's dissent which
stated:
The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by the
copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly
will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other hand, that granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others.
104 S.Ct. 774, 808 (1984). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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infringement which allows certain invasions of the copyright
owner's monopoly.20 The defense generally protects copying
which does not injure the copyright owner's market, and which
benefits the public by disseminating the information included in the
works. 2 '
Courts have long recognized that the search for an adequate definition of fair use is one of the most difficult problems in copyright
law. 22 An early test on the question of what constitutes fair use
addressed whether the work was primarily an informational or a
creative exposition. 23 The scope of fair use was deemed broader for
informational works, which, due to the limited number of ways
available to express the underlying theme or ideas, lend themselves
to nearly literal copying.24 Courts have sanctioned such copying
on a theory that authors of informational works have derived their
writing from prior informational works, and thereby, impliedly
consent to later authors' copying of their work. 5
20. The doctrine was first enunciated by Justice Story in the 1841 case of Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) which involved the copyright on
letters written by George Washington. Justice Story saw the test of fair use to be one of
injury. "If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the
labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute piracy pro tanto." Id. at 348.
21. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 15, § 1.10[D]. Professor Nimmer recognizes
that "[flair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not
materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied." Id. The most common
examples are those listed in the fair use provision of the Copyright Act: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
22. The fair use doctrine has been called "the most troublesome in the whole law of
" Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). See
copyright ..
also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174
(5th Cir. 1980) (pointing out the elusiveness of a workable definition for fair use).
23. Informational works would include news stories, biographies, historical works,
scientific texts, medical texts, and legal books. Examples of creative works would include
a play or novel. Annot., 23 A.L.R. 3d 139 (1969) (categorizing the various classes of
informational and creative works).
24. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966), in which the court stated, "[b]iographies, of course, are fundamentally personal histories and it is both reasonable and customary for biographers to refer to and
utilize earlier works dealing with the subject of the work and occasionally to quote directly from such works." Id. at 307. In addition, one court has held that if, at best, only
a limited number of forms of expression exist, "to permit copyrighting would mean that a
party . . . by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of
" Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967)
future use ..
(involving the copyright on a set of contest game rules).
25. See, e.g., Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 175
(S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd per
curiam by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (considering the copying of informational works); Henry Holt & Co., Inc. v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp.
302, 304 (D.C. Pa. 1938) (considering the fair use defense for scientific works). See also
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Creative works, on the other hand, do not lend themselves as
easily to an implied consent theory.2 6 Courts finding a fair use of
creative works have narrowly construed the defense to allow copying of the theme of the work, but not the actual writing of the
author.27

The question of whether the use is commercial or noncommercial has also been considered when defining the scope of the fair use
defense. 2 Traditionally, commercial uses have been held presumptively unfair. 29 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this presumption in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.30
Sony addressed the issue of whether private citizens' videotape recording of copyrighted television programs is a fair use. 31 The
Court found that home videotaping constituted a fair use because it
was not motivated by commercial interests and did not involve a
sufficient injury to the copyright owner's market.32 The opinion
also focused on the distinction between commercial and noncom33
mercial uses, finding the former to be presumptively unfair.
Despite this presumption against commercial uses, the ConsumThompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (D.C.N.Y. 1950) (acknowledging that fair
use allowed direct copying of scientific, legal and medical books). The rationale for such
copying was stated in Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 511 (1945): "[t]he world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself."
26. While works of science, law and medicine necessarily build upon prior works,
creative works, such as plays, are rewarded for being unique. As was acknowledged in
Loew's, " [a]s we draw further away from the fields of science or pure ... arts, and enter
the fields where business competition exists we find the scope of fair use is narrowed
...
" Loew's, 131 F. Supp. at 175 (referring to protection for creative works, such as
the play "Gaslight," which was the basis of the infringement action).
27. For example, when copyright is in a play, fair use would permit copying of the
theme of the play, but not the specific characters and dialogue. See e.g., Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (denying fair use to a musical closely based on "Gone With the Wind"). But see 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[C] (1984), for a discussion on satires and parodies
as fair uses. These uses allow a more literal copying of creative works, because they are in
the nature of criticisms of the works which they are parodying, and critiques are specifically listed in the Copyright Act as examples of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
28. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 13.05[A][1] for an extensive list of cases
which have considered the commercial versus nonprofit factor.
29. See supra note 5.
30. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
31. The suit was actually brought against Sony as a contributory infringer, for producing the machines with which the public was infringing. Id. at 774.
32. Id. at 792. The Court concluded that timeshifting, the recording of programs
when no viewer is present, is not of a commercial nature, but is merely done for the
convenience of the viewer who could have viewed the program for free in the first place.
Id.
33. Id. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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ers Union court found the use of a copyrighted work for commercial advertising to be a fair use. 34 Earlier, in Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had found a comparative advertisement which
used copyrighted material to be a fair use. The defendant's advertisement displayed the cover of defendant's television magazine
side-by-side with the cover of plaintiffs TV Guide Magazine.36
Despite the advertisement's commercial nature, the court found
the use to be fair because of the benefit that consumers gained by
having access to such comparative advertisements. 37 The Triangle
decision, along with Consumers Union, apparently represents a
more liberal definition of the fair use defense in the commercial
setting than does Sony.
Before these three cases were decided, Congress had enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976, which attempted to adopt a fair use provision consistent with the common law definition of fair use. 31 Section 107 of the Act lists four factors which a court should consider
when determining the fair use question. The first factor involves
whether the purpose and character of the use is primarily commercial or nonprofit. 39 The second factor inquires into the nature of
the copyrighted work, considering whether the work is informational or creative. 4° The third factor involves the relative amount
and substantiality of the portion copied in comparison to the copyrighted work as a whole. 4 Under this factor, large scale copying
has been deemed unfair.42 Small scale copying that is substantial,
in that it appropriates the essence of a work, has also been denied a
34. 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983).
35. 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
36. Id. at 1172.
37. The court relied on language of the Federal Trade Commission's Commercial
Practices Regulations which stated that "[c]omparative advertising, when truthful and
nondeceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and assists them in making rational purchase decisions." Id. at 1176 (quoting from 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (1980)).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
42. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the
court stated that "[w]hile other factors in the fair use calculus may not be sufficient by
themselves to preclude the fair use defense, this and other courts have accepted the traditional American rule that excessive copying precludes fair use." Id. at 758. See also
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964) (court found that when the amount of copying goes beyond merely allowing
the viewer to recall the copied work, but rather fulfills the viewer's need for the original,
then infringement will lie).
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fair use defense.43 The final factor is the injury to the author's market caused by the copying. 4
The statutory definition of fair use codified the judicially created
presumption against the fairness of commercial uses.45 In addition
to lacking statutory protection, commercial motives have traditionally been accorded little respect under the first amendment.
History of Commercial Free Speech
Historically, the first amendment's protection of free speech did
not extend to commercial speech.4 6 Commercial speech has been
defined by two considerations. First, the speech must promote the
sale of goods or services. Second, the motivation for the speech
must be the advancement of the speaker's financial interests.47
Commercial speech was not traditionally considered worthy of the
kind of free speech protection afforded to political speech. 48 This
43. See, e.g., Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 503 F. Supp.
1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (court acknowledged that
scenes copied from a Charlie Chaplin movie were "amongst Chaplin's best" and thus,
although the copying was not quantitatively significant, it was qualitatively significant).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
45. In codifying the fair use defense, Congress made clear that it was adopting prior
judicially created principles, such as the presumption against the fairness of commercial
uses, when it stated, "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680.
46. The Supreme Court first looked at the first amendment aspects of commercial
speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). That case involved a statute
banning the distribution of advertising handbills. The Court upheld the statute, stating
that, although the first amendment would forbid the banning of all attempts to distribute
information in public thoroughfares, there was no such limitation on the government's
regulation of purely commercial advertising. Id. at 54. See also Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door sales upheld). See generally
Note, Free Expression, supra note 8, at 448-58 (tracing the history of the commercial free
speech defense.)
47. Note, ConstitutionalProtection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720,
720 n.2 (1982). The author points out that economic motivation alone will not make the
speech commercial. Many types of speech, such as that contained in newspapers and
books, are partly made for economic purposes, but are not considered commercial
speech. Id.
48. See supra note 46. See also W. VAN ALSTYNE, Interpretationsof the FirstAmendment (1984), in which the author included a graph depicting the relative degree of first
amendment protection which has been afforded various forms of speech over the past
several decades. Id. at 41. The degrees of protection, in decreasing order, were listed as
follows: political, religious, philosophical, economic, private, social, scientific, aesthetic,
symbolic, libel, commercial, obscene, and criminal. Id. The author pointed to the potential for deception and manipulation as reasons for the low degree of protection afforded
commercial speech. Id. More recently, in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Virginia Pharmacy, the view that commercial speech is a subordinated interest was again expressed.
Justice Rehnquist stated, "I had understood [the first amendment] to relate to public
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position was based on a view that the goal of the first amendment
was avoidance of the political oppression that could occur if the
government were allowed to stifle political dialogue.49
As the United States became a purchasing society, with a greater
emphasis on consumer awareness, commercial speech assumed a
prominent role as a means of informing the public.5 0 Early attempts at gaining free speech protection for advertising were met
with resistance by the Supreme Court." The Court focused on the
in denying first amendmoney-making motivation of the speaker
52
ment protection to commercial speech.
During the 1970's, however, the Supreme Court began to focus
instead on the content of the advertising sought to be granted first
amendment protection. 3 For example, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.," the Court
decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision of
a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo." 425
U.S. at 787.
49. A strong argument in support of a limited political view of the amendment was
advanced in Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
Meiklejohn stated "We must recognize that there are many forms of communication
which, since they are not being used as activities of governing, are wholly outside the
scope of the first amendment." Id. at 258. The political basis of the first amendment was
also emphasized in A. Cox, Freedom of Expression (1981), in which the author stated
that "Only by uninhibited publication can the flow of information be secured and the
people informed concerning men, measures, and the conduct of government . . . . Only
by freedom of speech, of the press, and of association can people build and assert political
power, including the power to change the men who govern them." Id. at 3.
50. Advertising industry figures show that the average person in the United States
views between 50 and 200 advertisements per day. By the time a person reaches maturity, it is estimated that they will have seen over one million advertisements. C. GILSON &
H. BERKMAN, Advertisement Concepts and Strategies 3 (1980). See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 46, 48 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Valentine decision which focuses upon the money-making motivation of the speaker.
53. See Note, ConstitutionalProtection, supra note 47, at 722 (explaining the Court's
shift away from a motivational to a content theory of analysis). See generally, Farber,
supra note 8, at 384 (explaining the significance of Virginia Pharmacy in protecting advertising due to its content of valuable information). For illustrative cases in which the
Supreme Court considered the content of the commercial speech, see In Re R.M.J. 455
U.S. 191 (1982) (regulation on lawyer advertising); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (ordinance prohibiting billboard displays); Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (regulation
banning advertising by electric utility); Friedman v. Roger, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (ordinance
barring optometrists from practicing under trade name); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978) (suspension of lawyer for participating in face-to-face solicitation);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (law making it a misdemeanor to advertise abortion services).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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considered a state statute which had forbidden pharmacists from
advertising drug prices. It held that the statute violated the pharmacists' first amendment rights.15 In support of its holding, the
Court stated that advertising, despite its often tasteless and excessive nature, is nevertheless dissemination of information regarding
who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. 56 The Court concluded that, however slight the public
interest element, the free flow of commercial information is vital to
a consuming public.57
More recent decisions, however, have restricted the broad first
amendment protection afforded advertising by Virginia Pharmacy. 5s The Court has stated that commercial free speech occupies a subordinated position within the scheme of first amendment
rights and that restrictions on such speech will be valid if they
comply with the tests adopted by the Court.59
One of these tests, enunciated in Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Service Comm'n of N. Y,60 upholds the validity of a restriction on

commercial speech only if that restriction seeks to implement a
substantial government interest, directly advances that interest,
and reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective.61 Implicit in the Central Hudson test is a balancing of the
55. Id. at 770.
56. Id. at 765.
57. The Supreme Court stated that "(o)ur pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on
any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. . . . The 'idea' he wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I wish to sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.' " Id. at
761. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (recognizing the public's interest
in advertisements regarding abortions).
58. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) where the Court
distinguished the protection granted to commercial versus noncommercial speech by
holding that:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the
force of the amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.
Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead
have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while
allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
Id. at 456. See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (holding that the Constitution
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech).
59. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
60. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson involved a New York regulation which
completely forbade electric utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity.
The Court applied its own three-part test to determine the validity of the regulation and
determined that it violated the utility's right of free speech. Id. at 571.
61. Id. at 564-66. As a preliminary consideration to the three-part test, the speech
must be lawful and nonmisleading. Id. at 564. The Court did recognize a legitimate
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interests involved in the speech with the interests involved in the
law that seeks to restrict that speech.62
A second test regarding the validity of commercial speech restrictions is the "time, place and manner" test. 63 This test recognizes that valid restrictions may be placed on the time of giving the
speech, the place of giving the speech, and the manner in which the
speech is given.' The three-part test considers whether the restriction is justified without regard to the content of the speech,
whether the restriction serves a significant government interest,
and whether there are alternative channels for the dissemination of
the information underlying the speech. 65 The "time, place and
manner" test is very similar to the CentralHudson test in its consideration of the government interest and alternative routes of
dissemination.66
Neither test has ever been applied to restrictions on speech
caused by the copyright law. In fact, prior consideration of the
interplay between free speech and the copyright law has been
somewhat limited.67
government interest in conserving energy. Id. at 568. It also appeared that the regulation
on advertising would decrease consumption of electricity and thus advance the government interest. Id. at 569. The court found the regulation unconstitutional, however,
because of its far reaching scope. Id. at 570-71. The court suggested that the regulation
could have allowed advertising, but required information regarding the efficient use of
energy. This would have been a less restrictive and, therefore, a more appropriate restriction. Id.
62. See Burnett, Protectingand Regulating Commercial Speech: Consumers Confront
the FirstAmendment, 5 CoMM/ENT L.J. 637, 640-43 (1983) for a discussion of the workings of the CentralHudson test.
63. This test originated in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), a
case involving an ordinance prohibiting the display of nude persons on movie screens
visible to public streets. There, the Court stated:
A state or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable
time, place and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to
shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more
offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power.
Id. at 209 (citations omitted). The test was also enunciated in Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 771, in which the Court applied the test and found the restriction on drug advertising to be invalid.
64. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9
(1979) (upholding a restriction on certain advertising by optometrists).
65. 425 U.S. at 771.
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

The Tension Between Copyright Law and
the FirstAmendment
The coexistence of copyright law and the first amendment represents one of the most vexing inconsistencies in constitutional law.68
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "secur[e] for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." ' 69 The first amendment
mandates that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press." 70 One noted copyright commentator has recognized that copyright law abridges freedom of
speech, and that a literal construction of the first amendment
would render the Copyright Act unconstitutional.7 1 The Supreme
Court has provided little guidance in resolving this conflict.72
Lower court rulings, however, have shed some light on the issue.
The majority of those courts which have considered the impact
of the first amendment on copyright law have held that free speech
is not a valid defense to copyright infringement. 73 These courts
have denied a free speech defense by applying the idea-expression
68. See generally Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on
the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Goetsch, Parody as Free
Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 39 (1980); Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 320 (1979); Note, Copyright Law-One Step Beyond Fair Use: A
Direct Public Interest Qualification Premised on the First Amendment, 57 N.C. L. REV.
150 (1978); Note, Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 207 (1978);
Note, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L. REV.
1158 (1977).
69. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. See supra note 1.
70. U.S. Const. amend. I.
71. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 1.10[A]. However, Nimmer recognizes that
not every law which abridges free speech falls before the first amendment. Perjury, for
instance, is not protectible free speech. Id.
72. The lone light which the Supreme Court has shed on the area was dicta in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), when the Court acknowledged that the first amendment would not "privilege (copiers) to film and broadcast
a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner." Id. at 575.
73. E.g., Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d
Cir. 1982) (infringement of Charlie Chaplin films); Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (infringement of Dallas Cheerleaders poster); Wainwright Sec., Inc., v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977) (infringer published abstracts based on Wall Street Journal reports); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977)
(infringement of characters from H.R. Puffinstuff show); Encyclopedia Britanica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (copying of plaintiff's educational films); Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(action by author against publisher for unauthorized publication); Quinto v. Legal Times
of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981) (unauthorized copying of article in
law school newspaper); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative
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analysis.74 The idea-expression analysis is a fundamental concept of
copyright law which states that only the expression of an idea, but
not the idea itself, may be protected by copyright.75 Courts have
held that the first amendment protects only the free flow of ideas
and is not concerned with any particular expression of those
ideas.7 6 Thus, when an infringer copies an author's particular expression, the first amendment will not save him from liability."
This rationale was well illustrated by the case of Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pirates.8 In that case, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered the copying of Mickey Mouse, one of
Disney's best known characters, and held that there were an endless number of ways in which the defendant could have copied the
79
idea of a mouse without copying Disney's unique expression.
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (infringing musical based on "Gone With
the Wind").
74. The distinction between ideas, news events, and factual developments, all of
which are not copyrightable, and expressions of the same, which are copyrightable, serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the First
Amendment. Copyright protects the author's manner of expression, his analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals
facts, his choice of words and the emphasis he gives to particular developments.
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.D.C. 1981). See
also Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970) (for a discussion of the idea-expression analysis).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) states that, "In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea. . . regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982) states that, "Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression ....
" (emphasis added). See, e.g., Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (recognizing the distinction between idea and expression).
76. This view was well-stated in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), where the Court reasoned that "[b]ecause there are
available alternatives in the form of expressing any verbal ideas, first amendment considerations should not limit copyright protection in this area." Id. at 1171 n. 17. Therefore,
copyright protection of expression has no effect on the free flow of ideas which is vital to
the first amendment. Copiers are free to appropriate the ideas.
77. The Supreme Court tacitly approved this idea-expression analysis in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Scripps was a 'right of publicity'
action, which involved plaintiff's attempt to enjoin a news program from broadcasting his
"human cannonball" act. The right of publicity doctrine allows a person to benefit from
the commercial use of his/her name and likeness. In denying defendant's asserted first
amendment defense, the Court acknowledged that lower courts have dismissed such first
amendment claims in copyright actions by applying an idea-expression analysis. Id. at
577 n. 13. Although this reference to the idea-expression analysis was made in dictum, it
has been viewed as a tacit approval of the analysis. See also Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1179
n.2 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has given "its most general approval" to the
idea-expression analysis as a means of avoiding conflict between copyright law and the
first amendment).
78. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 759.
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Thus, the copying of Disney's expression was found to be a copyright infringement.8 0 The court believed that the interest in the
free dissemination of ideas was satisfied, since others were free to
copy the idea of a cartoon mouse.81
A minority of courts have held that the first amendment is a
valid defense to copyright infringement.8 2 One court has allowed
the first amendment to stand as a separate defense. 3 The District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. ,84 considered a copyright infringement action based on a comparative advertisement
which showed the plaintiff's copyrighted TV Guide cover. The
court recognized the fair use defense, but held it inapplicable here.
However, the court went on to hold that there is an important first
amendment interest in the dissemination of comparative advertising information. 5 Where the first amendment and copyright law
operated at cross purposes, the first amendment was found to
prevail. 86
Other courts have expressly mentioned the first amendment as a
defense to copyright, but have done so under the umbrella of the
80. Id. at 758-59. The court, having dismissed both the fair use and first amendment
defenses, found the copying to be an infringement.
81. Id. at 759. The court referred to its analysis of the idea-expression dichotomy in
Krofft. The Krofft decision had sanctioned the free use of ideas. See supra note 76.
82. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
321 (2d Cir. 1983) (copying from Gerald Ford's memoirs); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd on other grounds,
626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (copying from TV Guide); Keep Thompson Governor
Comm. v. Citizens For Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D. N.H. 1978) (copying of
political advertisement); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (copying of Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assassination); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (copying of Howard
Hughes biography).
83. Triangle, 445 F. Supp. at 884. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision on the basis of the fair use defense, without ever reaching the district court's first
amendment argument. Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1178. However, Judge Brown, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, took strong exception to the district court's approval of a
commercial free speech defense. Id. at 1178-82. Judge Brown first set forth the ideaexpression dichotomy in arguing that the first amendment did not protect Knight-Ridder's copying. Judge Brown next pointed to the limited protection afforded to commercial speech under Ohralik. Id. at 1181. Fair use rather than commercial free speech was
seen by Judge Brown as the appropriate defense to Triangle's actions. Id. at 1182.
84. 445 F. Supp. at 876. Knight-Ridder, which publishes the Miami Herald, ran an
ad showing the Herald's television guide cover side-by-side with the cover of Triangle's
TV Guide.
85. Id. at 884. The district court, in denying the fair use defense, placed emphasis on
the commercial nature of the use. Id. at 880. It nonetheless allowed a commercial free
speech defense. Id. at 883.
86. Id. at 882.
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fair use defense. 7 For example, in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,8s the defendant made sketches based on the copyrighted Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination. These sketches were
included in defendant's book which theorized on the reasons for
the assassination. The District Court for the Southern District of
New York pointed to the public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy and found
that the sketches were a fair use of the copyrighted film. 9 Similarly, in Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,9" the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the copying of large segments of Gerald Ford's memoirs by Nation Magazine to be a fair
use, based in part on its conclusion that the first amendment protected the public's right to receive information of great importance
to the nation. 91 While Time and Harper & Row both involved
political speech, Consumers Union is the first case in which a court
relied on commercial free speech to justify a fair use defense.
CONSUMERS UNION OF U.S., INC. V.
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP.

The Facts
Consumers Union publishes a monthly magazine, Consumer Reports, in which independent product evaluations appear. 92 The
magazine bears a notice informing readers that Consumer Reports
accepts no advertising or product samples and is not beholden to
any commercial interests. 93 It forbids use of the reports and ratings in advertising or for any other commercial purpose. 94
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
89. The court relied on the public interest in the dissemination of information, particularly because there was no proof of injury. Id. at 146. The court noted that plaintiff did
not sell the pictures. Id. It further speculated that the use of plaintiff's pictures would
enhance their value, rather than diminish it. Id.
90. 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321 (2d Cir. 1983) cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
91. Where information concerning important matters of state is accompanied by
a minimal borrowing of expression, the economic impact of which is dubious at
best, the copyright holder's monopoly must not be permitted to prevail over a
journalist's communication. To decide otherwise would be to ignore those values of free expression which have traditionally been accommodated by the statute's 'fair use' provisions.
Id. at 333.
92. Consumers Union of U.S. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1046 (2d Cir.
1983), reh'g en banc denied, 730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100
(1984).
93. Id. at 1046. The magazine further warns that "CU will take all steps open to it to
prevent such uses of its material, its name, or the name of Consumer Reports." Id.
94. Id.
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In its July 1983 issue, Consumer Reports evaluated lightweight
vacuum cleaners. 95 The article was very favorable toward the Regina Power Team Vacuum Cleaner, finding it to be the best in
cleaning ability.96 Regina, a subsidiary of General Signal Corporation, prepared two television commercials which quoted directly
from the article. 97
After one of the commercials was broadcast, Consumers Union
obtained an injunction from the district court, enjoining Regina's
use of the copyrighted language. 9 This injunction was subsequently vacated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 99 Consumers Union thereafter filed a petition for rehearing en banc,
which was denied without an opinion."° A dissenting opinion was
issued, however.""1
The Second Circuit, in determining whether the injunction was
appropriate, looked to Consumers Union's likelihood of success on
the merits.1 1 2 The main issue before the court was whether the
copying was protected by fair use.' 03 The court addressed the fair
use issue, as did the dissent in the subsequent decision denying rehearing, by analyzing the four statutory fair use factors.
The Appellate Court's Decision
Purpose and Character of the Use
In determining whether Regina's use was fair, the court first
considered "the purpose and character of the use.""° In so doing,
it found that advertising is a commercial use, but, relying on Triangle, it noted that this alone did not destroy the fair use defense.105
95. Id.
96. The report's comments regarding the Regina Power Team included: "Regina
Power Team-far ahead of the pack in cleaning ability. [O]nly one model, the checkrated Regina Power Team, was an adequate substitute for a full sized vacuum ....
It
alone left the carpet presentable after only one sweep, pristine after two sweeps." Id. at
1046-47 (quoting Consumer Reports, July 1983).
97. Id. at 1047 n.2.
98. Id. at 1048.
99. Id.
100. Consumers Union of U.S. v. General Signal Corp., 730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984),
denying reh'g en banc to 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
101. Id. at 48 (Oakes, J., dissenting). For pertinent portions of the dissenting opinion, see infra notes 112-14, 121-23, 127-28, 135-40 and accompanying text.
102. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1048.
103. Id. Consumers Union also charged General Signal with trademark violation and
unfair competition. These claims were addressed by the court, but are not relevant to this
note.
104. Id. at 1049. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
105. Id. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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The court observed that many works, such as newspapers and
magazines, are commercial in that they seek a profit. Nevertheless,
their publishers are not foreclosed from the benefit of the fair use
defense.10 6 The court did not view the statute's distinction between
commercial and noncommercial uses as a binding test on the applicability of fair use. 17 Rather, the distinction was characterized as
may be considered
merely illustrative of the subfactors which
10 8
within the purpose and character analysis.
It was during its discussion of the "purpose and character" factor that the court introduced the doctrine of commercial free
speech. 0 9 The court pointed out that the character of Regina's use
was consumer information, which is protected by the first amendment, 110 and further noted that commercial uses serve an important educational function for the public. I ' The court thus held
that the protection of the first amendment brought this commercial
use within the realm of the fair use defense.
The dissenting opinion in the decision denying rehearing viewed
the "purpose and character" factor as a bright line test. 112 If the
use was for nonprofit educational purposes, it was fair; if the use
was for commercial purposes, it was presumptively unfair. 1 3 The
dissent feared that by applying the commercial free speech doctrine, the court had taken the heart out of the fair use defense,'14
and destroyed the presumption against the fairness of commercial
uses.
Nature of the Copyrighted Work
With respect to the nature of the copyrighted Consumer Reports
issue, the court made two observations. First, the magazine was
106. Id. The court relied on Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), in making this observation. The Rosemont court held that "both
Id. at 307
commercial and artistic elements are involved in almost every [work].
(quoting Note, 56 COLuM. L. REV. 585, 597 (1956)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court felt that the content of Regina's advertisement, rather than its
motive for producing the speech, was controlling. This reasoning mirrors the Supreme
Court's focus upon the content of the speech in analyzing commercial free speech cases.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
111. 724 F.2d at 1049. The court also recognized the importance of repetition of the
Consumer Reports evaluation, given the short memory span of consumers. Id. at 1049
n.4.
112. Consumers Union, 730 F.2d at 48 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 48.
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found to be primarily informational, rather than creative." 5 The
court stated that the risk of restraining the free flow of information
is greater with informational works.' 1 6 It therefore concluded that
informational works
allow a greater permissible fair use than do
11 7
creative works.
The court further observed that Consumer Reports is primarily
evaluative." 8 The court recognized the general rule that an author's particular expression should not be copied, but reasoned
that when the copyrighted work is evaluative, the accurate reporting of the underlying ideas by others required exact copying of the
author's expression." 9 Therefore, the court concluded that informational and evaluative works lend themselves to a broad fair use
intrusion. 20
The dissent countered that while Consumer Reports was not as
creative as a play, it was more creative than catalogs and compilations, both of which are works entitled to protection under the
Copyright Act.' 2 ' It further argued that product evaluations require creative research in the areas of product quality and consumer motivation.' 2 2 Thus, the dissent concluded that
informational and evaluative works, such as Consumer Reports,
are as deserving of copyright protection as any other type of
115. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049.
116. Id. The court relied on Rosemont in making this observation. Rosemont held
that biographies, as compilations of facts, were entitled to a broad-based public interest
defense. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 309. See supra note 24. See also 3 NIMMER, supra note
27, at § 13.05[A][2] (1983) in which it was stated that "a work more of diligence than of
originality or inventiveness such as a catalog, index or other compilation. . . [allows] a
greater license . . . of fair use than would be the case if a creative work had been involved." Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977)).
117. 724 F.2d at 1049.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court reasoned that "Regina uses CU's words [expression] in the interest
of accuracy, not piracy." Id. The court relied on Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675 (1967) in reaching the conclusion regarding the need for exact copying.
Morrissey, which involved the appropriation of contest rules, stands for the proposition
that subject matter which is necessarily narrow, in that it allows only a limited number of
expressions, should have correspondingly limited copyright protection. See supra notes
23-25 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 1049-50.
121. Consumers Union, 730 F.2d at 48-49 (Oakes, J., dissenting). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (1982) which grants protection to compilations. A compilation is defined as a
"work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
122. Id. at 49.
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123

Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor considered was the amount and substantiality of
Regina's copying. 2 4 The court addressed this factor by noting that
one of Regina's commercials copied only one phrase, while the
other commercial copied only 29 words. 125 In relation to the original 2100 word26 article, this amount of copying was found to be
insubstantial. 1
The dissent pointed out that in a prior case, copying of one minute and fifteen seconds from a one hour and twelve minute movie
was held to be substantial. 127 Moreover, it viewed the copying by
Regina as substantial because it appropriated the essence of the
article, namely the conclusion
that the Regina Power Team was
8
cleaner.12
vacuum
best
the
Effect of the Use Upon the Plaintiff's Market
The court addressed the injury factor by considering Consumer
Union's argument that the use of its name in association with advertising would ruin its reputation as an unbiased evaluator and
thereby decrease future sales of Consumer Reports. 129 Such an injury was held not to be the type that the Copyright Act sought to
prevent.130 Rather, it concluded that any injury which Consumers
Union might have suffered was indirect, because it did not result
from Regina's appropriation of a substantial portion of the
article. 131
123. Id.
124. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1050. See supra note 41.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Consumers Union, 730 F.2d at 49 (citing Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.
1982) which held that a use can be quantitatively small yet qualitatively great.)
128. Consumers Union, 730 F.2d at 49. The dissent admitted that on this factor the
majority "is on its strongest ground," but added that "the copying of... the essence of
the findings as to one product is certainly substantial." Id.
129. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1050. A past case involving Consumers Union
illustrates this point. In Consumers Union v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., Inc., 314 F.
Supp. 697 (D. Conn. 1970), the court held that Consumer Reports' "reputation as an
impartial and untainted adviser is the foundation upon which the public's confidence
rests." Id. at 700. In addition, Consumers Union pointed out in its brief that television
viewers assume that advertisers have paid for endorsements, and will disregard Regina's
disclaimer as to any affiliation between Regina and Consumers Union. Brief for Appellee
at 14-15, Consumers Union, 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983).
130. Id. at 1050.
131. A movie review serves to demonstrate the "indirect injury" analysis. If a re-
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The court also noted that the Copyright Act requires that the
infringer's copying injure the value of the copyrighted work at issue.' 3 2 It explained that the Copyright Act's aim is to preclude
copying which reveals so much of the original work that the demand for the original falls. 33 Since the Consumer Reports issue
on vacuum cleaners had already been removed from the market at
the time of Regina's advertisement, there was no injury to the
copyrighted work, but only a potential injury to unwritten, un134
copyrighted future issues.

The dissent feared that the court's opinion did not recognize that
it was Consumer Reports' potential market, not its actual market,
which was at stake.1 35 It pointed out that Consumers Union could
sell its endorsements for a large profit.' 36 That Consumers Union
had not sold its endorsements showed the value it placed in re37
maining unassociated with product manufacturers.
The dissent also expressed concern that the court had focused
too narrowly on the actions of the defendant at bar, and therefore
failed to look at the overall harm to the plaintiff's business that
would occur if many product manufacturers were allowed to copy
from Consumer Reports. 38 If other product manufacturers were
allowed to follow Regina's lead, a large portion of Consumer Reports' market would disappear. ' 3 9 The dissent saw the court's ruling as a free license for manufacturers to infringe Consumer
Reports' copyright. 4
viewer shows a short clip from a movie and then proceeds to say that it is the worst movie
ever made, the commercial injury will be due to the reviewer's comments, and not necessarily the showing of the clip. However, if the reviewer were to show practically the
whole movie, then the injury in lost box office earnings would stem from revealing too
much of the original, and not from the reviewer's comments. See Consumers Union, 724
F.2d at 1051 (for a similar hypothetical).
132. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1051. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
133. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1051.
134. The court noted that back issues were available for purchase, but did not feel
that those people who might buy the back issues would be deterred by Regina's commercials. Id.
135. Consumers Union, 730 F.2d at 49 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
136. The dissent gave the "Good-Housekeeping's Seal of Approval" as an example of
the type of endorsement Consumers Union might sell. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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ANALYSIS

Commercial Free Speech: A Valid Defense to Copyright
Infringement?
The Consumers Union court, in analyzing Regina's copying,
chose to combine commercial free speech and fair use into one defense."'4 This section will analyze the two defenses separately. The
Consumers Union court invoked the doctrine of commercial free
speech, simply by recognizing that the advertisement disseminated
useful information.' 42 While citing Virginia Pharmacy in support
of its conclusion,' 43 it failed to distinguish the interests involved in
the two cases. The Consumers Union court also failed to apply the
Supreme Court's recent tests on the validity of restrictions placed
on commercial speech. A comparison of Virginia Pharmacy to
Consumers Union, and an application of the Central Hudson and
"time, place and manner" tests to the copyright restriction involved in Consumers Union would have constituted a more appropriate analysis.
Distinguishing Virginia Pharmacy and Consumers Union
The most striking difference between Virginia Pharmacy and
Consumers Union is the degree of restriction which is placed on the
dissemination of information in the respective cases. In Virginia
Pharmacy, a state statute banned the advertising of prescription
prices."4 Thus, the statute's total restriction on such information
kept the public in ignorance and was, therefore, justifiably struck
down by the Court.' 4 5
Consumers Union, on the other hand, involved no such total restriction on the dissemination of information. Although the Copyright Act denied Regina the use of Consumer Reports' language,' 46
the effect of this restriction differed from that in Virginia Pharmacy
because Consumer Reports' language had been available for one
month in a nationally distributed magazine and on radio and tele141. The court introduced free speech within the "purpose and character of the use"
factor of the fair use analysis. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
142. Id. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
144. 425 U.S. at 752. The Virginia statute subjected pharmacists to civil liability, or
to revocation or suspension of their licenses for engaging in unprofessional activities, such
as prescription drug advertising. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
145. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (in which the
Supreme Court discussed the impact of Virginia Pharmacy).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (which grants protection to the author's expression).
See supra note 75.
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vision news reports.'4 7 The underlying information had, therefore,
already been adequately disseminated to the public. Consumers
Union serves only to protect the second-hand transmission of the
information through Regina's advertising. Contrary to the court's
opinion, however, any interest in the second-hand dissemination of
information is arguably inadequate to overcome the interest in
copyright protection.' 48
Resort to the idea-expression analysis further distinguishes the
total restriction at issue in Virginia Pharmacy and the partial restriction at issue in Consumers Union. In the latter case, Regina
was free to use the idea underlying Consumer Reports' expression,
namely, that the Regina Power Team was rated number one. 49
Nonetheless, it chose to appropriate Consumer Reports' literal expression, and although Consumers Union argued against any reference to their magazine in Regina's ads, the Copyright Act would
allow such reference as long as it was not accompanied by copying
of expression. 150 Thus Regina could have referred to Consumer
Reports and paraphrased the article. Regina's appropriation of literal expression should not have been protected by the first amendment. The first amendment's requirement of adequate
dissemination is satisfied when the public is exposed to original expression through primary transmission of an author's original
work, and to the underlying ideas through secondary transmission
by copiers. 151

Accordingly, the court should not have sanctioned Regina's
147. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1047.
148. The goal of copyright law is the attainment of a mutual benefit for the public
and the copyright owner. See supra note 18. This goal was satisfied by the actions of
Consumers Union. The public received the benefit of access to the creative consumer
research printed in the magazine. The publisher obtained the financial benefit that was
secured by copyright protection in its creation. Since the mutual goals of the copyright
protection were satisfied, no apparent reason exists to justify Regina's appropriation. To
do so would upset the constitutional intent underlying copyright protection.
149. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 96 (setting forth the language appropriated by Regina in its
advertisement).
151. A similar argument was raised by the concurring and dissenting opinion in Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1181. That opinion noted that, while commercial free speech restrictions generally create a total ban on advertising, no such total ban existed in Triangle.
"The [Miami] Herald could refer verbally to T.V. Guide and could even have used the
facsimile of T.V. Guide's cover so long as the Herald did not copy or simulate an actual
cover of T.V. Guide. Thus, the objective of comparative advertising would not have been
completely thwarted." Id. at 1181. Likewise, in Consumers Union, the expression chosen
by Consumer Reports could have been paraphrased or changed, but not copied verbatim.
The ability to use the underlying ideas of Consumer Reports' article illustrates that the
Copyright Act did not completely thwart Regina's ability to advertise.
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copying on the basis of Virginia Pharmacy. In addition, application of the Central Hudson test and the "time, place and manner"
test for determining the validity of restrictions on commercial free
speech further demonstrates the inappropriateness of the Consumers Union court's first amendment rationale.
Supreme Court Tests
The Central Hudson Test
Since copyright monopoly is a restriction on the freedom of
speech, it may be analyzed in light of the Central Hudson test. In
determining whether copyright monopoly satisfies the Central
Hudson requirement that free speech restrictions serve a substantial government interest, 5 reference must be made to the constitutional basis underlying copyright law.
The Constitution's
allowance of copyright monopoly appears to satisfy this requirement. 153 However, Central Hudson further requires that the restriction directly advance the government interest.' 54 The grant of
a copyright monopoly does advance the constitutional interest in
promoting the useful arts, for without the protection of a monopoly, authors would not be motivated to create new works. 15 5 Only
through the guarantee that others will not be allowed to appropribe willing to invest the
ate the benefits of their labor will authors 56
time necessary to create the works of art. 1
The final Central Hudson consideration, whether the copyright
monopoly reaches further than is necessary to protect the underlying interest in creativity,' 5 7 may be addressed with the aid of the
idea-expression analysis. The Copyright Act restricts the use of
copyrighted expression, but not the ideas underlying that expression. ' 5 Regina was not restricted from the dissemination of Consumer Reports' idea that Regina's vacuum was the best. 5 9 It is
only because Regina chose to appropriate Consumer Reports' exact expression of its idea that the Copyright Act restricted Regina's
speech."' ° Arguably, the copyright restriction did not reach further than necessary to protect the interest in creativity, because
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra note 61.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See supra note 18.
See supra note 61.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Id.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See supra note 61.
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151.
See supra note 96.
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Regina still had ample latitude to express its idea. Thus, because
copyright monopoly serves a substantial government interest, directly advances that interest, and reaches no further than necessary, it is a valid restriction on commercial speech under Central
Hudson. The Copyright Act similarly places no undue restrictions
on commercial speech under an analysis employing the time, place
and manner test.
Time, Place and Manner Test
The validity of restrictions on the time, place and manner of the
giving of commercial speech depends on whether the restrictions
are justified without regard to the content of the speech, serve a
significant government interest, and provide alternative channels
for disseminating the speech.' 6 ' The Copyright Act does not restrict the time or place of giving the speech; however, it does restrict the manner in which the speech is given, by allowing only the
use of the underlying idea and not the expression itself.162
Copyright restriction does not depend upon the content of the
speech. The content of an infringer's speech is necessarily the same
as the content of the author's speech, and copyright protection is
granted accordingly. 163 Thus, copyright acts to protect against an
infringer's speech which incorporates an author's exact expression,
regardless of what the speech's content is." 6 For purposes of the
time, place and manner test, therefore, copyright restrictions are
not granted on the basis of content.
Further, the requirement of a significant government interest is
satisfied, as it was under the Central Hudson test, by reference to
the constitutional provisions which form the basis of the Copyright
Act. 165 The factor which addresses alternative channels of dissemi161. See supra notes 63, 64.
162. See supra note 75. As stated by Professor Nimmer, copyright protection "[in
some degree . . . encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it abridges the right to
reproduce the 'expression' of others .... ." Nimmer, supra note 74, at 1192-93.
163. The very existence of a justifiable copyright infringement claim shows that there
is either a very close approximation or an exact copying of the content of the copyright
owner's work. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 13.03[A].
164. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Under a more typical dispute regarding the commercial free speech defense, which would involve prohibition of a certain type of advertising,
the content factor becomes more important. For instance, legislation against a particular
type of advertising would necessarily be content-based and would fail the "time, place
and manner" test if not outweighed by a strong government interest. See, e.g., Virginia
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771, wherein the Court stated that the Virginia statute failed the
content factor of the "time, place and manner" test because it "singles out speech of a
particular content [drug prices] and seeks to prevent its dissemination completely."
165. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See supra notes 1, 153-56, and accompanying text.
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nation for the speech, as in Central Hudson, is answered by the
idea-expression analysis. 6 6 Regina had the alternative of using its
own expression of Consumer Reports' ideas, but chose to appropriate Consumers Union's expression of those ideas.
Application of either the Central Hudson or "time, place and
manner" tests to the Copyright Act illustrates that the Act's grant
of monopoly is a valid restriction on commercial speech which appropriates copyrighted expression. Accordingly, the Consumers
Union court should not have allowed a commercial free speech defense to a copyright infringement action. Nor should the fair use
defense have justified Regina's appropriation of Consumers
Union's language in its advertising.
Fair Use Defense For Commercial Advertising
Analysis of the Consumers Union fair use discussion requires
consideration of the Triangle decision, which was the first case to
allow fair use for commercial advertising, and the Sony decision,
which reaffirmed the presumption against the fairness of commercial uses. Triangle and Sony illuminate the considerations which
are necessary in considering the "purpose of the use" and "potential injury" factors set forth in the Copyright Act's fair use
provision.
Consumers Union as an Extension of Triangle
Before Consumers Union, only Triangle had allowed a fair use
defense for purely commercial advertising. 67 Accordingly, the
Consumers Union court relied on Triangle in holding that commercial uses are not 'per se' unfair. 68 While Triangle does support the
general proposition that commercial uses of a copyright owner's
work can be fair, it does not appear that the Triangle rationale
would support a fair use defense under the Consumers Union facts.
In Triangle, the court found it significant that only the cover
from plaintiff's TV Guide Magazine had been copied,'6 9 and cautioned that its decision might have been different had the magazine's contents been copied.170 In Consumers Union, not only were
166. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
167. Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1173. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 13.05[A][1]
(for a discussion of the Triangle decision). See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
168. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
169. "As a matter of logic and common sense, Knight-Ridder's conduct would have
been far more serious had it reproduced entire articles from TV Guide or full pages of TV
schedules." Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1177 n.15.
170. Id. at 1177. As one commentator noted, "[i]t
is difficult to believe that anyone
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the contents copied, but those contents represented the heart of the
copyrighted work. 7 ' Thus, the extension of the fair use defense in
Consumers Union exceeds the boundaries set by Triangle.
Moreover, Consumers Union is distinguishable from Triangle
with regard to its consideration of the potential harm to the copyright owner.'7 2 The Triangle court concluded that there was no
possible injury to TV Guide, because the issue which was copied
was already outdated and off the storeshelves. 73 While it is true
that Consumer Reports was similarly off the shelves, Consumers
Union had other derivative markets for its evaluation. The Copyright Act grants protection not only to the original copyrighted
work, but also to any later works which are derived from and utilize the copyrighted work.' 74 In the case of Triangle, it is unlikely
that any derivative use could be made of past TV Guide covers. 75
In Consumers Union, however, derivative works existed in the
form of two later issues of Consumer Reports which included the
vacuum cleaner evaluation, and in the 1984 Buying Guide issue,
7 6
which is a compilation of all of the previous year's evaluations.1
Further, as the dissent recognized, Consumers Union could have
77
sold its endorsement to manufacturers for a substantial profit.

Consumers Union involved an injury to the copyright owner's
potential market that was not present in Triangle. It is questionable whether the Triangle court would have taken the revolutionary
purchases the magazine simply to ponder the cover-the only part reproduced by the
defendant. Any harm suffered by the plaintiff results from competition with an independently created work rather than from exploitation of plaintiffs own copyrighted material." Denicola, supra note 68, at 306.
171. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1047 n.2.

172. See Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1177-78.
173. Id. at 1178. The court cited with approval the following law review commentary: "While it is true that defendant's purpose in creating and marketing a television
supplement was to reap economic benefit by capturing part of the market held by TV
Guide, defendant's use had no appreciable deleterious effect upon the potential demand
for the issues shown, since the programming schedules were out of date." Id. at 1178
(quoting Note, Copyright and the First Amendment-Triangle Publications, Inc. v.

Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 1979 Wis. L. REV. 242, 262 (1979).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982) (granting protection to derivative works). The Act
defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
175. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
176. The article was reprinted in the 1984 Buying Guide (published in December
1983), while the appeal decision was handed down on December 6, 1984. See Brief for
Appellee at 38, Consumers Union, 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983).

177.

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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approach of allowing the fair use defense for an advertisement had
it been considering the Consumers Union facts.
The Guiding Principles of Sony
The Sony Court drew a sharp distinction between copying for
"commercial gain" and for "non-commercial purposes," holding
that commercial uses are a presumptively unfair exploitation of the
monopoly which belongs to the owner of the copyright. 7 8 In Consumers Union, the Court attempted to overcome this presumption
through application of the commercial free speech defense, which,
for reasons explained above, was arguably inappropriate. 7 9
The Sony Court also gave a greater insight into the injury factor
of a fair use analysis than had previously existed. The Court held
that present harm need not be proven, but only a likelihood of
some future harm. 80 The Court went on to state that when the use
is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed."8 ' Thus,
in Consumers Union, even though the court did not see any potential harm to plaintiff, under Sony it should have presumed such
harm.
Other aspects of the Sony discussion on potential harm are relevant to an analysis of Consumers Union. The Supreme Court
noted that material which has a broad potential for secondary or
derivative markets should have a broader protection, due to the
high potential for commercial injury."12 Consumer Reports, with
its variety of derivative markets,18 3 arguably should have been
granted such a broad protection.
The Sony Court also noted that in focusing on the question of
harm, courts should consider the adverse effects of widespread
copying.8 4 This fear was emphasized by the Consumers Union dissent, which warned of the dire effect on Consumer Reports' market
178.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). See

supra note 33.

179. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
180. The standard for proving the likelihood of future harm is "by a preponderance
of the evidence." Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 793.
181. Id. For noncommercial purposes, the likelihood must be demonstrated. Id.
182. Id. at 795 n.40. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
184. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 793. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 13.05[A][4],
which states, "[t]his factor ... poses the issue of whether unrestricted and widespread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant (whether in fact engaged in by the defendant or by others) would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market for or value of the plaintiff's work."
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if only a handful of manufacturers follow Regina's lead.' 85 Consumer Reports could be harmed substantially if the public did not
feel the need to purchase the magazine, but rather, waited to hear
the test results through television advertising.
Under Sony, it appears that the commercial advertising by Regina should not have been granted a fair use defense. The presumption against the fairness of commercial uses coupled with the
the allowance
showing of a potential injury should have precluded
186
Union.
Consumers
in
defense
of the fair use
IMPACT OF CONSUMERS UNION

Consumers Union can be seen as offering a free grant to infringe
copyright because the court, in finding a fair use, invoked the doctrine of commercial free speech to protect the "conveyance to consumers of useful information."'' 87 Almost any speech may be
185. Consumers Union, 730 F.2d at 49. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying
text.
186. Although the "purpose of the use" and "potential harm" factors appear to be
dispositive of the fair use issue, consideration should also be given to the "nature of the
work" and "amount and substantiality" factors as provided by the Copyright Act. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
The "nature of the work" is both informational and creative. Although the work is
informative as to what products are highly rated, it is creative in its field of product
testing and consumer motivation. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. It is
arguable that if the public is to be benefited by creative consumer research then such
creativity, as a constitutionally protected interest, should not be stifled by fair use intrusion. See supra note 18. The Consumers Union court, in recognizing that the work was
evaluative, held that possibly the only way to properly convey the underlying ideas was
by direct quotation. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049.
There may exist copyrighted works in which actual copying will be required to convey
the underlying idea, such as with photographs. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (only through the copying of the actual
scene portrayed in a photograph could the public be adequately exposed to the ideas
underlying the photograph). However, when the work deals with the written word, there
are always alternatives to copying an author's direct expression. See Sid & Marty Krofft
Television v. McDonalds' Corp. 562 F.2d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the "nature"
of the work as evaluative and informative does not dictate a finding of fair use.
No clear-cut decision can be reached under the "amount and substantiality" factor in
Consumers Union. While the copying of 29 words out of a 2100 word article is not quantitatively significant, it is qualitatively significant in that it summarizes the gist of the
article. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
187. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049. One commentator has advanced an argument warning of the dangers of a broad-based first amendment defense:
[T]he effect of a public interest based first amendment privilege is potentially
devastating from the standpoint of copyright protection. Everything is imbued
with public interest to some degree; therefore, the result would be either a first
amendment privilege dependent on the subjective values of the judiciary or a
privilege so broad in scope that the mere fact of infringement would be proof of
public interest.
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found to be useful to some group of persons. The commercial nature of copying has historically precluded the fair use defense,
which is most successful in the context of noncommercial uses,
such as newsreporting and classroom use. 88 After Consumers
Union, the further granting of fair use to commercial speech, with
the only caveat being that the speech contain useful information,
could allow virtually any use to be deemed fair.8 9 Thus, the exception of fair use could swallow the rule, allowing a free pardon to
all copyright infringers. Surely, fair use was not meant to usurp
copyright protection.
Even apart from the fair use defense, Consumers Union indicates
that commercial free speech alone could stand as a defense to copyright infringement.' 90 Moreover, the establishment of commercial
free speech, a subordinated first amendment right, as a defense to
copyright infringement, will naturally lead to a more liberal appli9
cation of free speech as a defense in noncommercial settings.1 '
Thus, the approval of commercial free speech as a defense to copyright infringement could lead to a situation in which many previously unprotected forms of copying would be shielded by the first
amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Consumers Union Court took the novel approach of using
Note, Copyright Infringement, supra note 68, at 333. Thus, Consumers Union's "useful
information" protection can be likened to a public interest based first amendment privilege, allowing virtually unrestrained copying by merely showing public interest and
usefulness.
188. See supra note 21.
189. See Note, Copyright Infringement, supra note 68, at 333 (explaining the
problems of invoking a first amendment defense). Since virtually any speech can be
deemed useful under Consumers Union, an infringer can overcome the presumption
against the fairness of commercial uses merely by showing the speech's usefulness to
some group of persons.
190. The court stated that "[r]egardless of motive, the 'character' of Regina's ads
includes the conveyance to consumers of useful information which is protected by the
first amendment." Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049. If the ads were "protected by
the first amendment," the court need not have continued on with its fair use analysis.
Thus, by applying the first amendment alone, the court could have avoided any consideration of the fair use factors favoring Consumers Union, namely, the "purpose of the use"
and the "potential injury" factors.
191. See supra note 59. As stated in Ohralik, commercial speech is subject to "modes
of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. Accordingly, stricter constitutional requirements for regulations on commercial speech could be followed by more stringent constitutional tests of
regulations against noncommercial speech. A relaxation of sanctions against infringers
copying for commercial purposes could allow an even freer reign for infringers copying
for noncommercial purposes.
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the doctrine of commercial free speech to justify a fair use defense
for an advertising use of copyrighted material. Although commercial speech has been granted limited first amendment protection,
those cases affording such protection have not involved interests as
substantial as the copyright law. Both the CentralHudson and the
"time, place and manner" tests, when applied in a copyright situation, indicate that commercial free speech is not a valid defense to
copyright infringement.
In considering the availability of fair use for an advertisement,
the presumption against the fairness of commercial uses should apply. Further, as the Sony Court held, when the use is commercial,
injury should be presumed and the use found unfair.
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